1. How many Black and non-White peoples were displaced by urban renewal as of July 1967?

“Urban renewal means Negro removal” James Baldwin claimed in 1963. These words express what most Americans, and most Newark residents, now think of urban renewal: racist, anti-Black, anti-urban. Indeed, as the data from Newark’s urban renewal experience illustrates, 77% of people displaced by urban renewal were Black in a city that was only 34.1% Black in 1960. The emotional cost of losing one’s home, friends, and neighborhood was disproportionately placed on non-White peoples.

Racial dot map of black neighborhoods (blue). and white neighborhoods (green). reveals that “slum” clearance was concentrated in black neighborhoods:

One dot = 50 people

Urban renewal displacements in Newark:

Displaced Blacks:	35,000 (77%)	25 out of every 100 Blacks
Displaced Whites:	11,000 (23%)	4 out of every 100 Whites
Total:	46,000 (100%)	11 out of every 100 Newark residents of all races

In the early 1960s, when most Newark residents were White…	.	34.1%* Newark’s Black population	65.6% Newark’s White population
Most people displaced by urban renewal were Black.	.	77% of displaced people were Black	23% of displaced people were White

* Only 0.3% were some race other than Black or White in 1960.

Source: Mapping Inequality Data from the University of Richmond
And this article

2. How much did urban renewal cost taxpayers as of July 1967?

These people were displaced because planners reasoned that their neighborhoods were blighted slums. Planners reasoned that clearing the land would attract outside developers to invest there in rebuilding higher-quality buidings, which would in turn improve property taxes collected from these lands. Or, in the case of public housing, residents would benefit from improved quality of life and access to better amenities like indoor plumbing and private bedrooms, which many older and more crowded neighborhoods lacked. On the books, urban renewal looked like a net positive to Newark.

However, an estimated two thirds of 47,272 families displaced by urban renewal moved no further than 12 blocks away from their former location in the closed ghetto. (source). Residents forced out of the slum areas merely crowded into surrounding and more stable neighborhoods, thereby making these neighborhoods more crowded and accelerating their own decline. This produced a knock-on effect when White people and wealtheir people in these neighborhoods moved away when they saw the influx of displaced peoples.

Furthermore, federal and city funds were more often spent on demolishing old neighborhoods than on building new neighborhoods. For public housing projects, both demolition and rebuilding costs were covered by the government. For other projects like middle-class homes, working-class housing, commercial, industrial, and retail developments, government paid for demolition and clearance but it was expected that developers would pitch in to rebuild. This never happened. Developers did not pitch in, and when they did, it was often years after the land had been cleared and sat vacant.

In this way, there were multiple costs to urban renewal: the short-term financial cost of these projects and then the long-term social and environmental costs due to private capital’s failure to match the government’s investment in cities with their own investments. The numbers below are only a partial account, as they represent only government expenses. The number of displaced peoples is also partial, as they do not represent the knock-on effects of White flight from neighborhoods adjacent to urban renewal areas. For every one Black to arrive in Newark, an estimated two Whites fled.

The full financial cost of urban renewal is therefore broad in scope and hard to calculate.

Source: Newark Housing Authority Data from the Newark Public Library
Values and displacements by July 1967.
Not inclusive of later funding and construction.

Totals	45,820 displaced persons	2,423.5 acres = 3.8 sq miles	$128 million in federal funds	$53 million in local funds
.>Project	People Displaced	…>Acres	Federal Funds	City Funds
Little Italy West half by Branch Brook (1952)	702	20.4	$2,304,000	$1,151,000
Little Italy East half by Broad Street (1952)	433	22.6	$2,970,000	$1,483,000
Old Third Ward (1955)	13,000	224.9	$14,898,000	$6,333,000
Rutgers/NJIT Campus (1959)	2,658	57.0	$7,838,000	$3,499,000
Newark Plaza Gateway Center (1959)	91	34.5	$10,518,000	$4,755,000
Educational Center Seton Hall (1959)	184	21.4	$2,724,000	$856,000
Hill Street (1959)	141	12.9	$4,309,000	$2,024,000
South Broad Star-Ledger (1959)	1,380	42.3	$6,575,000	$2,969,000
St. Benedicts (1963)	693	35.0	$5,323,000	$2,438,000
Essex County College (1960)	2,289	49.2	$7,248,000	$3,260,000
Essex Heights (1963)	950	14.0	$4,540,000	$1,410,000
Lower Clinton Hill (1959)	6,250	78.2	$1,611,000	$829,000
Central Ward (1957)	6,447	94.6	$10,337,000	$4,968,000
UMDNJ Fairmount (1961)	4,464	87.5	$12,695,000	$3,937,000
UMDNJ Medical Center (1967)	3,163	54.2	$13,596,000	$3,471,000
St. Michael’s (1964)	1,400	46.3	$12,439,000	$5,807,000
Industrial River (1962)	1,575	1,528.5	$7,919,000	$3,794,000

3. How many units of housing were lost or gained as of July 1967?

Despite all its problems with financing and construction, Newark did succeed in replacing one-for-one each demolished unit with a new one. Over the two decade span from 1949 to 1967, Newark demolished 14.5 thousand and built 11.5 thousand, creating a net loss of only three thousand units. This net loss in the housing stock evaporates when the most controversial of all urban renewal projects – the campus of UMDNJ that displaced 7,627 people – is excluded. UMDNJ was controversial for good reason.

At the same time, although the city succeeded in replacing demolished units, the process was drawn out. New units were almost always in different or distant neighborhoods from the demolished units they were meant to replace. New units were often built years after demolition, giving residents the challenge of finding acceptable “temporary” housing.

So “does urban renewal mean Negro removal”? The local and national picture is complicated. Black people were moved and removed in disproportionately large numbers relative to their small population. But they usually moved to immediately-adjacent neighborhoods, which in turn became more Black. In addition, the vast majority of new-build units were occupied almost entirely by Black residents. White residents could afford to move away from the city and did so in vast numbers. Blacks could not afford to or were not allowed to move away, and therefore resided in larger numbers in the new projects. So, in some ways, the effect of urban renewal was more to displace and spread out Blacks over a larger area. If the intent had been to remove or contain Blacks, the best course of action would actually have been to never demolish the slums and to never displace the Black residents in them.

Source: Newark Housing Authority Data from the Newark Public Library

Totals	-14,536 units lost	+11,461 units gained	-3,075 net loss
.>Project	Housing units demolished	Housing units created	Difference
Little Italy (1952)	-1,100	+1,556 Columbus Homes +1,240 Pavilion / Colonnade	+1,696
Old Third Ward (1955)	-3,446	+6,636	+3,190
Rutgers/NJIT Campus (1959)	-1,176	+0	-1,176
Newark Plaza Gateway Center (1959)	-28	+0	-28
Educational Center Seton Hall (1959)	-36	+0	-36
Hill Street (1959)	-84	+440	+356
South Broad Star-Ledger (1959)	-521	+132	-389
St. Benedicts (1963)	-206	+0	-206
Essex County College (1960)	-786	+0	-786
Essex Heights (1963)	-353	+0	-353
Lower Clinton Hill (1959)	-1,910	+597	-1,313
Central Ward (1957)	-1,758	+860	-898
UMDNJ Fairmount (1961)	-1,406	+0	-1,406
UMDNJ Medical Center (1967)	-1,234	+0	-1,234
St. Michael’s (1964)	-291	+0	-291
Industrial River (1962)	-201	+0	-201